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Bounty systems in vermin control 
". . . almost total lack of success, usually accompanied by frauds" 
Simon Whitehouse 
Agriculture Protection Board of 
Western Australia 
For more than 3 000 years man 
has tried to reduce the numbers of 
pest animals by payment of bounties. 
In general, the system has failed. 
This article, by a research scientist 
who specializes in the study of de-
clared (pest) animals in Western 
Australia reviews some of the liter-
ature about bounties and comments 
on the situation in Australia. 
It concludes that the arguments in 
favour of bounty systems for animal 
population management are extremely 
hard to justify, and little evidence of 
the operation of any successful bounty 
system can be found. 
Bounty systems appear to be 
counter-productive in terms of al-
leviating the problems caused by 
pest animals. As a means of rural 
subsidy they are illogical. 
"Bonus" or "bounty" systems 
may be defined as the payment of 
rewards to hunters for the killing of 
animals regarded as pests. The 
systems are intended to control ani-
mals that either compete with, or are 
injurious to, man's interests. The 
most frequent targets are predators. 
Such programmes have been in 
operation around the world for 
about 3 000 years. The ancient 
Greeks paid bounties on wolves (1) 
and, since then, bounties have been 
paid on a wide variety of animals. 
These have ranged from predators of 
stock—wolves, bears, dingoes, etc.— 
through to such animals as emus, 
seals, crows, mountain lions, squir-
rels and porcupines, and the reasons 
why the bounties have been offered 
are varied. 
It is difficult to find in the literature 
any documented cases which report 
the successful use of the bounty 
system. The little support that can 
be found appears to consist of 
letters and articles in non-technical 
journals, based largely on opinions 
rather than facts. 
In the United States, bounties date 
back to 1683 (2) when the State of 
Pennsylvania introduced bounties to 
control predators of game. Since 
then all American States have, at 
various times, inaugurated similar 
programmes. Most States still use 
bounty systems. 
In colonial America, tobacco was a 
medium of exchange and was used 
as the bonus payment. Today money 
is the usual payment, although other 
valuable tender, such as livestock, 
has been used. 
Jacobsen (3) carried out a compre-
hensive survey of the various systems 
that have operated in the United 
States. In reviewing the basic re-
quirements of any scheme, he quotes 
from an 1896 report of the United 
States Department of Agriculture. 
Dr. T. S. Palmer, at that time First 
Assistant in the U.S. Biological 
Surveys, stated: 
Any scheme intended to bring 
about the extermination of a 
species must fulfil certain con-
ditions before it can prove success-
ful in practice: 
• It must be applied over a wide 
area, practically covering the range 
of the species, otherwise the animal 
will increase in the unprotected 
region. 
• It should be uniform (that is, 
the rates should be the same) in all 
localities. 
• It should provide some induce-
ment for carrying out its pro-
visions. 
• It should be economical, for, if 
expensive, the cost will exceed the 
losses which it seeks to avert. 
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• It should provide, so far as is 
possible, against fraud or the mis-
appropriation of public funds. 
Hamilton (4) enumerated another 
requirement, that "theoretically, a 
bounty must be high enough to 
ensure the destruction of at least a 
majority of the individuals during 
the first bounty season". 
From a model simulating coyote 
population dynamics Connolly and 
Longhurst (5) determined that if the 
annual kill was 75 per cent., the 
population could be exterminated 
in slightly more than 50 years. How-
ever when they studied the data from 
a county in California, they con-
cluded the coyote numbers were not 
being reduced at all; instead, the 
reproduction rate was being locally 
stimulated. 
The problems facing the use of 
bonus payments to control animal 
numbers are large. Fairley (6) des-
cribed the central problem as being 
two-fold: 
• The payment must be large 
enough to induce a kill in one sea-
son which is appreciably larger 
than that caused by the natural 
mortality factors. 
• If the initial reduction is 
achieved the hunting of the smaller 
numbers requires more effort and, 
unless greater and greater bounties 
are paid, equilibrium is reached or 
the species is allowed to move to 
its original level. Alternatively, 
the hunters, whose interests are 
concerned, will ensure that the 
animal is not exterminated. 
Jacobsen discussed many systems 
that have been evolved, and the 
theme is generally one of almost 
total lack of success, usually accom-
panied by frauds. As soon as the 
monetary incentive becomes high 
enough to satisfy the first criterion 
above, frauds of two basic kinds 
occur. 
The first is caused by the non-
uniform payment of bonuses in 
different areas. This results in the 
movement of scalps or other proofs 
of destruction from areas of low or 
no bonus, to areas of high bonus pay-
ments. 
The second type of fraud consists 
of the substitution of the scalp of an 
animal of no bonus value for that of 
an animal on which the bonus is 
being paid. 
The Michigan Department of Con-
servation reported as follows in 1922: 
The history of the Michigan bounty 
law on predacious things is dotted 
with the work of those who 
padded bounty orders, manu-
factured woodchuck scalps by 
sewing ears on pieces of pelts, 
collected bounty on house-cats 
claiming them to be "wild-cats", 
of substituting blackbird heads for 
baby crow heads; of claimants 
stealing from township clerks the 
once bountied and discarded scalps 
and heads; of others who pur-
chased Wisconsin weasel, where no 
bounty is paid, and collected a 
bounty in Michigan on them, 
falsely swearing they had been 
captured in this State. 
One of the most amazing frauds 
must be that cited by Hamilton where 
a payment of a bonus of $50 on a 
wolf scalp in the New York State 
was made in 1947. There had been 
no authentic record of a wolf in that 
State since around the turn of the 
century. 
"Bonuses, in themselves, 
not been responsible 
satisfactory control 
predator population" 
for 
of 
have 
the 
any 
But the possibility of fraud occur-
ring is by no means the main draw-
back of the bounty systems. Bonuses, 
in themselves, have not been respons-
ible/or the satisfactory control of any 
predator population. 
The Pennsylvania Game Commis-
sion paid a bounty on weasels for 
over half a century and, at the end of 
that time, the largest number of 
weasels during the history of the 
bounty were being presented annually 
for payment. 
In Minnesota, a 12-year bounty 
period for foxes yielded evidence of a 
steady rise in the fox population. At 
first 25 000 were killed per year, but 
this rose steadily to 40 000. 
The payment of bounties on 
squirrels in Great Britain appears to 
have had no effect on the population. 
Wolves and coyote populations in 
Ontario appear to be totally 
unaffected by the payment of bon-
uses^. 8). 
The bounty does not appear to 
have had any effect on the mountain 
lion population in California(9). 
Virginia encouraged the killing of 
wolves almost from the date of its 
first settlement and has, at times, 
paid $25 each for their scalps. How-
ever wolves in that State were not 
exterminated until the Civil War 
period, after the rewards had been in 
force for more than two centuries. 
Even then, their extermination was 
not because of the bounty, but 
rather through the settlement of the 
State(lO). 
Probably the most detailed exami-
nation of any bounty system was 
carried out by Fairley, when he 
examined the Northern Ireland sys-
tem of fox control. He concluded 
that the only fox "predator" was man 
and that, by a variety of methods, a 
large number of foxes were killed 
each year. He believed that this 
hunting, whether bounty-inspired or 
otherwise, did not make any sub-
stantial long-term difference to the 
population. The reasons were: 
• If the bounty is affecting foxes 
in N. Ireland, it is curious that it 
is maintaining them at a more or 
less constant level without reduc-
ing them further. When bounties 
were suspended in certain 
countries, there was no sign of an 
increase in the animals. 
• There are many areas where 
foxes are not hunted, often because 
they are remote or inaccessible or 
no-one bothers to hunt them. 
• Statistical analysis of the 
bounty figures tends to suggest that 
the numbers of foxes caught in 
winter and early summer bear no 
relation to the numbers caught 
next winter. 
• It can be concluded that less, 
possibly much less than 33 percent 
of adults are killed by man and 
very much less than 44 per cent 
of the cubs. 
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Fairley concluded that the bounty 
"is of no value in keeping down 
foxes". The major mortality factor 
was disease, and even though a large 
number of deaths may be attri-
buted to the bounty, many of the 
foxes killed by man would have died 
anyway due to natural causes. No 
additional mortality was being added 
to the pre-existing natural mortality. 
This point is often missed by 
advocates of the bounty system, who 
maintain that by killing many indivi-
duals, they must be reducing the 
population. Mech(ll) reports on 
studies where the natural mortality 
in the wolf populations in their first 
year of life is 50 to 70 per cent, and 
this may run even higher. 
From the evidence cited above, 
there seems little doubt that the 
bonus system as a means of reducing 
predator populations has not been 
effective. Jacobsen states: 
At no time in our 30 years of 
direct and indirect association with 
predatory animal control have we 
encountered any bounty payment 
plan which, of itself, has success-
fully brought about the reduction 
of predators when and where 
needed. Apparently, the ideal 
bounty system has yet to be 
devised which, through proper and 
periodic upward adjustments of 
payments, commensurate with the 
scarcity of the animals to be 
controlled, will continue to induce 
hunters or trappers to seek out 
a reduced predator population or 
wary specimen, before dishonest 
and fraudulent practices creep 
in to nullify any advantage gained. 
However, there is one case where a 
form of the bounty system appears to 
have been successful. In a large area 
of the U.S.S.R. centred around 
Moscow, the wolf has been virtually 
eliminated. The bounty paid per wolf 
is equivalent to about four months' 
wages for an agricultural worker. 
This success appears to be due to 
(a) the amount of enthusiasm that the 
local population shows towards kill-
ing wolves and (b) the bonus system 
—both factors being assisted strongly 
by the social structure of the Soviet 
Union (Bibikov pers. comm.). 
Mech states that "when payments 
are high, capture techniques efficient, 
and the density of the species to be 
bountied low, bounties may be 
effective. In certain areas, parti-
cularly on the edges of the wolf's 
range or where the range is limited 
the bounty could be a significant 
factor in reducing a wolf population." 
The Soviet Union experience would 
seem to support this. 
However the same large amount of 
money is also paid in the Baltic 
States, but the local Governments 
have a different attitude towards the 
wolf and, even though the law and 
the bonus are the same as in the 
Moscow region, a healthy wolf 
population still survives. Possibly 
the most important factor is the 
social pressure exerted on the indivi-
dual to believe that killing a wolf is 
a good or bad thing. 
It could therefore be concluded 
that the bounty as such, despite 
representing one third of a year's 
salary, is not the reason for the wolf 
population decline in the Moscow 
region. 
The Australasian experience 
The course of bonus payments and 
bounty systems in Australia has been 
similar in all respects to the rest of 
the world. It has not been possible to 
find one documented case where a 
bounty system has been successful. 
"Many of the foxes killed by 
man would have died anyway 
due to natural causes" 
The problem of fraud has been and 
still is a major problem in Australia. 
Victoria has a fox bonus and acknow-
ledges that malpractices occur in 
trafficking of scalps into the State 
from nearby shires in New South 
Wales and South Australia where no 
fox bonus is paid. 
In New Zealand there was a bonus 
for possums, but this was stopped in 
1961 when it was apparent that all 
the bonus had achieved was to 
spread the animals throughout New 
Zealand(12). 
There have also been reports of 
dingo scalp movements between areas 
in Western Australia where big dif-
ferences exist in bonus payments. 
They can vary from $2 to $20 in 
adjoining shire areas and this is more 
than enough to induce people to get 
the higher rate by falsifying position 
reports. There have been rumours 
of people paying SI5 each for scalps 
. . . would have died anyway, due to natural 
causes. 
in one shire and subsequently obtain-
ing $20 each in a neighbouring shire. 
In 1969, South Australia raised the 
bonus it paid on dingo scalps from $2 
to $4 and then to $6. At the same 
time, Victoria, New South Wales, 
Western Australia and Northern 
Territory were paying $2. In that 
year, the number of scalps handed in 
for payment was 19 490—a consider-
able increase from the 3 000-odd 
scalps of the year before. In 1970, 
the bonus was lowered and reports 
indicate that the scalp returns are 
now back to the pre-1969 level. 
This case illustrates very clearly 
the basic problems of the bonus 
system. Where did all those 19 490 
scalps come from? It is a moot 
point whether they resulted from 
vastly increased hunting pressure on 
the dingoes within South Australia or 
as a result of a movement of scalps 
across the borders. 
It is also arguable that the bonus 
was lowered because the campaign 
was successful. The payments for 
bonuses would have risen from 
around $6 000 to $120 000. From 
the arguments of Jacobsen and 
Hamilton, this level would need to be 
maintained for at least some years, 
and probably should have been 
increased considerably. 
The places in Australia where 
dingoes have been reduced in num-
bers are probably very similar to 
those outlined above in the U.S.A. 
where wolves and coyotes have been 
reduced. When European man first 
settled the continent, dingoes were 
distributed throughout the mainland. 
However, as land has been cleared 
for agriculture and become more 
densely settled, their range has been 
reduced and their distribution has 
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become patchy. The south-western 
corner of Australia is now virtually 
without dingoes. 
However in the Murchison district 
we find a case which meets the 
criteria cited above by Mech where 
bonuses will work: low dingo popul-
ation level, easy access, enthusiastic 
hunters and high bonus. 
In the area around the town of 
Cue, there are a number of large 
sheep stations and dingoes are 
extremely rare. However, if a dingo 
is known to be in the area, a large 
bounty is offered immediately and 
the individual is removed fairly 
quickly. The bounty is from a 
permanent fund that is maintained 
for this reason. The low dingo 
density is probably due originally 
to the accessibility of the country 
leaving few dingo refuges available, 
and to the almost total land use by 
the station owners. It is kept low by 
the very high bonus on the few 
dingoes that occur. But even this 
sort of scheme may be subject to 
fraud. 
Similar studies to those of Fairley, 
although in less depth, have also 
been carried out in Australia. Figure 
1 shows the number of dingo scalps 
submitted for payment in the Pilbara 
district of Western Australia from 
1962-75. This shows that the 
number has remained virtually con-
stant despite fluctuations in bonus 
payments. At the same time, evi-
dence strongly suggests that the size 
of the remaining population has not 
decreased at all—in some areas it may 
have increased. Figure 2 shows 
similar results in South Australia. 
Tomlinson(13) plots figures for 
dingoes, foxes, eagles and emus in 
Western Australia (see Fig. 3) show-
ing that for a period of nearly 30 
years the number of bonuses paid on 
these animals varied independently of 
the size of the bonus. The annual 
number of bounties paid for dingoes, 
eagles and emus remained virtually 
constant, while the number of boun-
ties paid for foxes increased from 
about 2 000 in 1928 to 45 000 in 1956. 
The figures indicate that the bonus 
has had no effect on reducing the 
populations of these animals. 
Also, as with wolves and foxes 
cited above, the animals killed are 
probably mainly those that would 
have died anyway. In Western 
Australia, half of the dingoes caught 
are less than one year old and 78 per 
cent, are less than two years old— 
the young and inexperienced ani-
mals that are most subject to natural 
mortality. 
Conclusions 
So far, the discussion has centred 
mainly around the concept that the 
aim of a bonus system is to reduce a 
target population and therefore al-
leviate whatever problem it may have 
been causing, and this generally 
seems to have been the aim with 
most bounty systems. 
However, if the aim is purely to 
"alleviate the problem" then the 
U00 
bounty system must be counter-
productive. As soon as a bounty 
offered on a target animal is suffici-
ently large to warrant the effort 
involved in claiming it, the incentive 
is to get a "scalp" regardless of 
whether the individual animal was 
causing a problem or not. This 
situation develops into a paradox, as, 
more often than not, the high 
population concentrations of the 
target animal (and therefore the 
most easy to catch) are not where the 
animal is presenting a problem to 
man. 
The bonus system therefore tends 
to force hunters to remove non-
1962 63 75 1976 
Fig. I—Dingo scalps submitted for bonus payments in the Pilbara region of W.A. 
1962-1975. 
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Fig. 2—Dingo scalps submitted for bonus payments in South Australia, 1910-1970. 
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problem animals from areas of high The final consideration of a bounty 
populations while the low population system must be one of social benefit, 
concentrations are neglected and the Gertsell(14) talked of the "wide-
original problem caused by the spread distribution of large sums of 
animal persists. money in the form of bounties", and 
Wild dogs 
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24 
18 
12 
6 
Emus 
i • • i 
35 
i i i i i 
40 
• i i i i 
45 5 
• i i i i i i 
0 56 
l~ 
_JL 1 1 1 1 
20c 
104 
1928 30 35 40 45 50 56 
Scalps . Bonuses 
Fig. 3—Relationships between rates paid and number of scalps received annually 
( f rom Toml inson (13)). 
concluded that this was an important 
economic factor in rural North 
America. He states that "payments 
have often meant much to rural 
families". 
In Western Australia this is a 
doubtful consideration as, in most 
cases, the bounty payment per unit 
animal is small. In places where it is 
large, it is even more doubtful, as the 
finance for these large payments is 
raised in taxes from the "rural 
families" themselves. If, therefore, 
the aim of offering a large bounty 
payment is to provide a form of rural 
subsidy, the method of financing the 
bonus payments, in Western Austr-
alia at least, would seem logically to 
negate this aim. 
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